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Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to show the main concepts of M. Henry’s phenomenological 
approach to corporality in Philosophie et Phénoménologie du corps (1965), the principal work where 
M. Henry develops these analysis. Here he frequently uses Maine de Biran’s (1766–1824) arguments to 
promote his own philosophy. Cartesianism, Empiricism and Kantian philosophy –the same as 
mainstream Biomedicine– conceive the body as an object. Henry describes the kind of body outlined by 
Biran as an 'incarnated body', highlighting the role of language operating in how we end considering our 
body as an ‘object’. To Henry, the body is subjective and is the ego itself: a body which is an “I”. This 
is the ‘original fact’ with which his phenomenology begins. Henry claims for the need of an ontology of 
subjectivity, because an empirical conception of interior life only shows the failure of empirical 
psychology in the attempt to explain movement and corporality in general. Henry tries to build a 
phenomenological ontology of the body. The type of movement which intellectualism attempts to 
reconstruct is in reality only a representation of movement. 
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Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar os principais conceitos da fenomenologia da corporalidade 
de M. Henry em Filosofia e Fenomenologia do corpo (1965), trabalho no qual Henry desenvolve esses 
conceitos e com frequência utiliza os argumentos de Maine de Biran (1766-1824) para promover sua 
própria filosofia. O cartesianismo, o empirismo e a filosofia kantiana – assim como a biomedicina 
tradicional – concebem o corpo como um objeto. Henry descreve o tipo de corpo esboçado por Biran 
como um “corpo encarnado”, destacando o papel da linguagem que opera na forma como acabamos 
considerando nosso corpo como um “objeto”. Para Henry, o corpo é subjetivo e é o próprio ego: um 
corpo que é um “eu”. Este é o “fato original” que funda sua fenomenologia. Henry reivindica a 
necessidade de uma ontologia da subjetividade, porque uma concepção empírica da vida interior só 
mostra o fracasso da psicologia empírica em seu intento de explicar o movimento e a corporalidade em 
geral. Henry objetiva construir uma ontologia fenomenológica do corpo. O tipo de movimento que o 
intelectualismo intenta construir é, na realidade, apenas uma representação do movimento. 
 
Palavras-chave: Ontologia fenomenológica encarnada. Corpo. Linguagem. Michel Henry. 
 
INTRODUCTION. BUILDING A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY OF THE 
BODY: A BODY WHICH IS AN “I” 
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The English translation of M. Henry’s Philosophie et Phénoménologie du corps (PP) 
(1965) appeared in 1975 as Philosophy and phenomenology of the body (Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague). In this book «Henry frequently uses Biran's arguments to promote his own philosophy» 
(O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 48), intending to deploy his first serious approach to a 
phenomenological ontology of the body, under the strong influence of Maine de Biran (1766–
1824) and his analysis towards ‘movement’ (O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 44; COPPLESTON, 
1982). Henry is undoubtedly the phenomenological thinker who has been most attentive to the 
problem of self-manifestation and affectivity, and it would be completely incorrect not to 
include those concepts within the problem of the body and corporality. Affectivity, corporality 
and self-manifestation (self-affection) (ZAHAVI, 1999, pp. 2-4) are almost impossible to 
separate in real life experience. At this point, psychoanalytic practice led me to the same 
conclusion. I shall, unfortunately, be compelled to treat this subject far too briefly, as it can be 
treated properly only by giving long catalogues of facts.  
Maine de Biran «was an opponent of the eighteenth-century philosophy advanced by 
the English empiricists Locke and Hume» (O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 44), who tried to end the 
problem by treating the body as an object among others. Nowadays, mainstream biomedicine 
– for example – upholds the same assumption. Conversely, «Henry describes the kind of body 
outlined by Biran as an 'incarnated body'; it is the 'original fact' with which his phenomenology 
begins (PP 4) » (O’ SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 45). As Henry puts it: «Because the body, in its 
original nature, belongs to the sphere of existence which is the sphere of subjectivity itself» 
(HENRY, 1975, p. 8). That’s why many authors agree with the idea that Henry’s 
phenomenology is chiefly concerned not with what appears, but with the appearance itself. 
Since Henry’s work consistently seeks to locate his phenomenology of the body in the joy and 
pain of ‘ordinary reality’, specifically located in praxis and ‘real’ life, the way in which he 
builds the concept of the subjective body seems to be a major contribution to the epistemology 
of corporality. Moreover, Henry spends much of his time arguing against what he describes as 
an ideology of science that has neglected the fact that our body is much more than a mere 
‘object’, warding off the problem of subjectivity by reducing every notion to materially oriented 
ideas.  
According to Henry, the body must become «the theme of an investigation which takes 
the real man as its object, not the abstract man of idealism, but this being of flesh and blood 
which we all are». This is his «project of a first philosophy» (HENRY, 1975, p. 7). For 
Henry – who follows Biran –, the body is subjective and is the ego itself: a body which is 
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an “I”. «Biran seeks to substitute a transcendental phenomenology for a classical and empirical 
psychology» (O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 47), gesture followed by Henry with his material 
phenomenology. Besides, «Biranism is ‘essentially a philosophy of motor effort’» 
(O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 54) that wishes «to move the understanding of the body away from 
rationalist approaches that regard movement as an ‘unconscious or physiological process’ 
(Henry, 1975, 100)».  
Henry «supports Biran's argument against the dominant philosophies of the nineteenth 
century by writing that contrary to rationalism ‘it is necessary to say that aIl knowledge derives 
from experience, because the condition of possibility of experience is itself an experience’ (PP 
34) » (O’Sullivan, 2006: 48). Henry’s later works such as La barbarie (1987) and Incarnation 
(2000) are also strongly influenced by Biran’s rejection of empiricism and rationalism, which 
deal with «the abstract man reduced to the condition of a pure subjectivity» (HENRY, 1975, p. 
7), as we may find it in Kant. In fact, the rephrasing of being in terms of effort and resistance 
brings Biran closer to Spinoza than Descartes, and Henry’s affinities with Spinoza are well 
known by his master degree thesis (Le bonheur de Spinoza, 1942). This led us to think that 
Spinoza remains as a main influence to Henry and his characterisation of affectivity as ‘first 
philosophy’, that is, as ontology.  
 
 
1 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BACKGROUND. THE REJECTION OF HUME’S 
EMPIRICISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL LACK IN KANTIAN 
PRESUPPOSITIONS  
 
«For Biran, empiricism only knows a region of ontology that describes being as 
‘transcendent and sensible’ in terms of ‘facts’ regarded ‘as natural phenomena’ […]. It 
conceives of the elements of life as 'purely artificial ideas of class or genre, as collections of 
abstract modes of sensation'» (HENRY, 1975, pp. 32-33).   
Hume understands the body as an «ensemble of transcendent masses», or as he writes 
himself, as «the interior play of nerves and muscles that the will is supposed to put in action in 
the movements of our limbs» (HENRY, 1975, p. 87).  
In comparing Hume’s understanding of the body to that of an anatomist or a physiologist, 
Biran asks ‘what species of analogy is there between the representative knowledge’ of «the play 
and functions of our organs, that an anatomist or physiologist is capable of knowing, and 
the intimate sentiment of existence which corresponds to these functions? » (HENRY, 1975, 
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p. 88). Henry points out that Hume does not have any «ontology of subjectivity» (1975, p. 88), 
that it does not accept Biran’s claim that «we are able to have a sentiment without knowing in 
any way its means», and that it «has no need to speak of our desire, our wish to accomplish 
movement, since it is not disposed to any theory likely to take account of the belonging of these 
psychic states to the self’ […] » (O’SULLIVAN, 2006, p. 52). As Henry himself puts it:  
 
Once it becomes an instrument, the movement of the body is given to us only 
in a transcendent experience. The theme of thought would then be this 
instrument and not the goal of action or of movement which it wishes to 
accomplish, which is absurd, for, presupposing that the subject can think of 
both the means and the goal of its action at one and the same time, this does 
not mean that it would execute this action, it would merely represent it, it 
would represent to itself its [84] goal and the means for arriving at it, but it 
would not act. This thought of the goal and of the means surely exists, but the 
thought of movement is not movement. The latter is an entirely new 
phenomenon with respect to this thought and this is precisely the phenomenon 
with which we are dealing. The conception of the body as an instrument of 
our action is therefore an element of our representation of movement, but it 
cannot in any way be part of a theory of real movement itself. Hence, we 
apperceive more and more clearly that the ontological theory of subjective 
movement, far from reducing movement to its idea, rather makes us arrive at 
the conception of the only foundation possible for the reality of movement and 
the body. (HENRY, 1975, p. 61). 
 
That’s why «we would have to be in possession of an ontology of subjectivity and not 
an empirical conception of interior life […]. Hume, who bears the heavy inheritance of 
Cartesian dualism, divides into a first phase which is will or desire to accomplish movement 
and a second phase which consists in the corresponding material process» (HENRY, 1975, p. 
63). From the perspective of a phenomenological ontology, «this causality, before being an 
idea, is a power and this power is revealed to us in the same way as the being of the ego with 
which it is fused» (HENRY, 1975, p. 71).  
Henry points out that «The first condition which a theory of the movement of one's own 
body must satisfy is to be in a position to account for a feeling of this movement which I 
accomplish myself, of a power in the course of its exercise, a power which is mine» (HENRY, 
1975, p. 65).  
This type of analysis also shows the complete failure of empirical psychology, because 
«the type of movement which intellectualism attempts to reconstruct is in reality only a 
representation of movement whereas the being of movement and the problem of its original 
knowledge completely escapes it» (HENRY, 1975, p. 66). While the field of inquiry 
remains only at the level of representation, the variety of modes of givenness of our body 
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– shown clearly by Henry with the analysis of movement –, many of our direct experiences 
with our body – mainly affectivity – remain unthought. One of the most important contributions 
of Maine de Biran – recovered brilliantly by Henry – consists in accounting for the fact that the 
core of our experience with ourselves usually remains far away from theoretical or intellectual 
knowledge. It is evident that Freud dealt with the same problems, though of course from a 
different perspective, where the clinical concerns come to first place, because the main 
analytical task targets suffering, and not just representation. Continuing along this line, it was 
Paul Ricœur in De l’interprétation (1965) one of the firsts to show the cardinal feature of 
psychoanalysis: Freud’s mixed epistemology, mainly built by two different types of concepts 
and lines of thought: on the one hand, the energetic one, where we may locate the concepts of 
Trieb (drive), Affektbetrag (quantum of affect), Libido, Wunsch (wish) and all the processes 
related to repression in general, which where described by Freud as Seelenvorgänge, as 
processes related to the soul. What the Metapsychology names as ‘dynamics’ and ‘economics’, 
in short. On the other hand, the hermeneutic one, related to the main issue of interpretation, the 
meaning of symptoms, phantasies, our history and the whole symbolic dimension which, at last, 
includes the very notion of ‘culture’. According to Freud, the Ego is ‘culture’ in each one of us. 
Returning to our theme, similar objections arise towards Kantian presuppositions. In a 
Kantian perspective, «only two sources of knowledge exist: sensation and judgment» (Henry, 
1975, p. 70). As Henry puts it, the entire philosophy of Maine de Biran  
 
consists precisely in the affirmation that the feeling of action does not result 
from a sensation, that action is known in itself insofar as it pertains to the 
sphere of subjectivity, insofar as it is a fact of the relationship of immediate 
knowledge to itself” […]. We have asserted that movement is known to us 
immediately and we have denied that muscular sensation or any other form of 
mediation plays the smallest role in this primordial knowledge which is ours 
and which is less a knowledge of our body than the phenomenological being 
of this body itself. (HENRY, 1975, p. 70).  
 
That’s why Henry asks:  
 
Where does the being of the ego find a place in such an ontology, where is its 
concrete life, its action, its movement? » […]. «In order to be in a position to 
answer these questions, which are the lot of first philosophy, we must first 
reject Kantian ontology and be possessed of an ontology which is first of all 
an ontology of life, an ontology of subjectivity and the ego. Doubtless, I judge 
that it is I who act; such a judgment presupposes the intervention within my 
mind of the idea of causality, but the transcendental deduction of the 
categories has shown us that the latter do not float in air nor do they occupy 
our mind by accident; rather they have a foundation which is precisely the 
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concrete life of the ego, its action and its movement, in a word, its body. Not 
only […] the idea of necessity presupposes the idea of causality and that the 
idea of causality presupposes the idea of action, we must still see that the idea 
of action presupposes action itself. (HENRY, 1975, p. 71).  
 
At this point, Henry shares the same ideas developed by Freud in his Project of 




2 THE ‘TWOFOLD USAGE OF SIGNS’ AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL AMBIGUITY WHICH LEADS TO THE 
‘BODY–OBJECT’  
 
This section discusses the role of language operating in how we end considering our 
body as an ‘object’. Cartesianism, Empiricism and Kantian philosophy –the same as 
mainstream Biomedicine– (still) conceive the body as an object. According to these 
perspectives, in which this body–object belongs to nature –res extensa–, 
 
everything takes place as if the body were nothing other than this object which 
we see and as if the original being of the body whose ontological analysis we 
have given were nothing but a chimera […]. There is a sort of absorption of 
the originally subjective being of the body in this body which manifests itself 
to us among things, the first becomes interior to the second and the entire 
being of our body is reduced to its constituted being. (HENRY, 1975, p. 109). 
 
Henry –again following Biran– upholds the idea that if the element immanent to my 
body is considered as the nucleus of the body–object, ‘object’ which I can see or touch, «that 
which we call immanence has thus become the very essence of the transcendent» (Henry, 1975, 
109). But  
 
before clarifying the fundamental ontological ambiguity which presides over 
the occurrence of such a transformation, we first must show how this 
transformation is at the origin of the perception or the knowledge which we 
have of our body, of this knowledge as it is expressed by common sense in 
everyday language. (HENRY, 1975, p. 109). 
 
After discarding the thesis according to which movement could be known by way of 
muscular sensation, Henry turns to analyse how we use common language –a method very 
well known by psychoanalysis– to show how this daily, cultural uses frequently refer to the 
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implicit assumptions we uphold unconsciously. From his peculiar phenomenological 
perspective, the eye, the ear and the hand are elements of the transcendent body. This common 
sense language says:  
 
The eye sees the panaroma, the hand moves toward the table and touches it, 
its ear hears the melody. The eye, the hand, the ear are elements of the 
transcendent body, they manifest themselves to consciousness in the truth of 
being, there they have a place, a spatial configuration and perceived or 
scientifically determined relationships with all the objects of nature. It is 
precisely such transcendent elements which bear within themselves the 
nucleus of the body, i.e. this ensemble of powers whereby the body sees, 
moves, touches, and hears. Nevertheless, the latter had been characterized by 
us as belonging to a sphere of radical immanence, as constituting the being of 
a subjective body. (HENRY, 1975, p. 109). 
 
According to Henry, the results of the ontological analysis of the original being of our 
body – the transcendent body– constitute a part of absolute knowledge upon which 
phenomenological ontology is built. Here appears what we have referred to as the genuine 
Biranian contribution. It is therefore clear that Henry uncovers a genuine epistemological 
problem within empiricism: 
 
Moreover how could we maintain this absurdity whereby ultimately what we 
see and touch would also be that which sees and touches? This body which 
we [152] see and which we call our own presupposes, as Biran has shown us, 
another body which sees and which touches, which sees and touches all things 
and among them this body which is seen and touched. It is this other body 
which is the original body, whose being has been determined as belonging to 
the sphere of absolute subjectivity outside which it was unable to arise without 
losing everything which makes it what it is. (HENRY, 1975, pp. 109-110). 
 
This original being of our body is an ontological power which cannot be identified or 
incorporated into an element of nature. The arguments that support the impossibility of this 
identification are given by Henry conjointly when he explains what Biran called “the twofold 
usage of signs”. In fact – states Henry –  
 
this identification is a naive representation and actually an illusion. It is the 
general theory of this illusion that Maine de Biran proposes to us in the 
analysis of what he calls "the twofold usage of signs." Let us consider the 
experience of seeing: It is an internal transcendental experience. This 
experience transcends itself toward a world, but it takes place entirely within 
a sphere of radical immanence. If we now express in language this experience 
of vision, we use the word "to see" which is, to speak as Maine de Biran, the 
"sign" of seeing. How this sign is related to the internal experience of seeing, 
how, in a general way, language is based on the life of absolute subjectivity 
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which it expresses, this is what cannot be clarified here. (HENRY, 1975, p. 
110).   
 
 
3 THE PROCESS OF FOUNDATION OF REFLECTIVE LANGUAGE IS 
ULTIMATELY REDUCED TO THAT OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
To Henry, this fundamental ontological ambiguity leads to call attention to language, as 
many other phenomenological thinkers have remarked; and we may also suspect here the strong 
influence of Freud’s psychoanalysis in this account. Of course, as it is well known, this is a 
statement often made by psychoanalysts. As Henry puts it:  
 
The process of foundation of reflective language is ultimately reduced to that 
of natural language. Even if we assume that the words 'I see' designate the 
representation of my seeing and not my seeing itself, nevertheless, it is upon 
the latter, upon its radically immanent experience and upon it alone, that their 
meaning ultimately rests […]. The entire ontological ambiguity in the 
phenomenon described by Maine de Biran under the name of the "twofold 
usage of signs" resides in the fact that a relationship is established between the 
words 'I see' and a physiological organ, such that the sign 'to see' has a twofold 
usage and designates both the eye, or at least a property thereof, as well as the 
internal transcendental experience of seeing. (HENRY, 1975, p. 111).  
 
And a few pages after Henry clarifies the main differences between the ‘physiological 
objectivity’ and the ‘objectivity of being’, highlighting that the individual ego cannot be 
identified with any organic center: 
 
“From this stems a frequently illusory similarity between the physiologist and 
the metaphysician who, while using the same terms, believe they are dealing 
with the same things or subscribing to the same system of ideas”. The 
relationship of the original being of the body to the system of organs which 
physiology studies can only be, according to Biran, a symbolic relationship at 
the end of which the physiological division appears as a symbol or a sign of 
the transcendental division […[. For example, if we consider movement, 
physiology will think that it can account for it by imagining a center of action 
in the brain which will serve as the origin from which this movement begins. 
"But is this anything other than a symbol? Can the individual ego be identified 
with any organic center? Is the action which we relate 'objectively' to such a 
center the same as that which we attribute to ourselves in the intimate 
consciousness of effort? Are these not two ideas, two facts of a totally different 
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4 CONCLUSIONS: THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE. THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THESE TWO "FACTS", THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BODY AND THE 
ORIGINAL BEING OF OUR BODY 
 
To a certain extent, it seems that Henry arrives to Heidegger and his idea of the 
ontological difference, but he uses this concept to clarify the being of our body and its 
transcendental constitution. Though the similarities, we should remember that Henry aims to 
rise higher in the scale of understanding the philosophical status of the body, when Heidegger 
followed another philosophical horizon.  
Henry concludes that  
 
since the relationship between these two "facts", i.e. between the physiological 
body and the original being of our body, is analogous to the relationship 
between the sign and the thing signified, the philosophical meaning of this 
relationship is twofold: On the one hand, the sign aids us in our comprehension 
of the thing signified, "Every metaphysical analysis, confidently basing itself 
upon a physiological division between the organs, their functions and 
interplay, receives therefrom this clarity, this apparent facility which images 
communicate to reflective notions, by uniting themselves with them as 
symbols destined to explain what is in itself obscure;" on the other hand, this 
aid is illusory; it makes us believe that "by combining certain organic 
movements we can deduce... psychological facts which can only be verified 
by the intimate sense," such that "the so-called explanations teach us nothing 
about the subject in question and only serve to obscure it by substituting 
confused images for simple and perfectly clear ideas of reflection”. This latter 
text, which again asserts the absolute character of the evidence inherent in the 
sphere of transcendental immanence, suggests that we re-question many 
analyses of Biran in which physiological investigations appear as a necessary 
and useful complement to peculiarly psychological investigations. (Henry, 
1975, pp. 114-115). 
 
Towards circumscribing the problem of the constitution of one's own body and the 
question of the ‘two bodies’ and the ontological difference, what Henry intends to signify when 
he speaks of ontological dualism is merely the necessity of the existence of this sphere of 
absolute subjectivity, without which our experience of the world would not be possible. 
Towards the question of the two bodies, the ‘subjective–body’ and the ‘body–object’, 
 
it becomes immediately apparent that the duality which splits in an 
incomprehensible manner the unity of the being of my body and which causes 
this being to be given to me twice, so to speak, finds its foundation in the 
ontological structure of truth, a structure in virtue of which something 
manifests itself to us in the truth of transcendent being only on condition of a 
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more original revelation in a milieu of absolute immanence. (HENRY, 1975, 
p. 115). 
 
At last, Henry states that  
 
Ontological dualism is the foundation for the twofold usage of signs. Because 
there exist, as Maine de Biran says, "two sources of evidence", our body is 
given us in a way such that each of its original powers, concerning which we 
have an immediate knowledge in the subjective experience of movement 
which constitutes its essence, also manifests itself to us in the form of an organ 
or some physiological or spatial determination. The difference between the 
original being of this power and the organ which seems to be its instrument is 
in no way situated on an ontic level, it is not a difference between something 
and something else, it is an ontological difference, not a difference in 
individuality, but in the manner of being, i.e. relative to the region at the heart 
of which being manifests itself and exists [161]. (HENRY, 1975, pp. 115-
116). 
 
Though the ensemble of problems relative to the body are not –of course– fully solved, 
Philosophie et Phénoménologie du corps let us find ourselves in the presence of certain 
schemata of thought that will be enlarged in other studies like Incarnation (2003), for example. 
To say that the ontological dualism is the foundation for the twofold usage of signs seems to be 
a quite a Heideggerian conclusion, but with the addition of this new dimensions when referring 
it to the body and its constitution, and with another ontological horizon interior to which he 
philosophised. But much deeper and more notorious is the influence of Maine de Biran on 
Henry, as we have tried to show along this paper. After studying Philosophie et 
Phénoménologie du corps, it is even possible to conjecture that for Henry, Maine de Biran 
would be a central and founding figure of a phenomenology of movement and action (J'agis, 
donc j'existe, or j'agis, donc je suis), as proposed by Vancourt in La théorie de la connaissance 
chez Maine de Biran (1942), who already highlighted the existence of a very precise conception 
of the nature of unconscious representations in Maine de Biran (1806) (VANCOURT, 1944, p. 
10). 
We shall thus see that Maine de Biran already referred to the fact that the immediate 
certainty of the existence of the body is entailed in 'the primitive fact' (the 'first philosophy' to 
which Henry often refers, ontology), and that 
 
la connaissance que nous avons de ce corps est une connaissance par 
l’intérieur, par ‘sentiment’ (…). Sur le terrain de l’apperception immédiate, 
du sentiment intérieur, l’union de l’âme et du corps s’impose (est une donnée) 
purement a ma constatation (…).  Dans le fait primitif, est une connaissance 
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par l’intérieur et non une représentation objective par idées. (VANCOURT, 
1944, pp. 70-74). 
 
This connaissance par l’intérieur (et non une représentation objective par idées) 
defines, in a certain way, one of the main cores of Henry’s phenomenology and, as far as I am 
able to judge, a capital assumption to understand our corporality from the perspective of 
absolute subjectivity.   
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